Make Cybersecurity Great Again, Again.

Another ‘we can fix infosec‘ is out there.

“OK I admit we can’t make cybersecurity great again, because it never was great in the first place”.

It was certainly better than it is now. At one point in time, we had the technical folk, but not the managers. Now we have neither. There was a brain drain from security around the early 2000s whereby tech folk left in droves, either voluntarily or ‘as a business need’. They were seen as aesthetically unpleasing at a time where the perception was that a threat did not exist! In the proceeding years risks increased on the top of the aforementioned shedding of intellectual capital from organisations. Then around 2010 things reached boiling point when security incidents found their way back on the front pages of the Financial Times.

So around 2010 some organisations wanted to get ‘tech’ again but since all the skills were lost 10 years ago, who knows what good looks like? The same folk who inherited the kingdom of security with their fine aesthetics were now charged with finding the skills, while not knowing what the skills look like.

“President Trump recently appointed Rudy Giuliani as cybersecurity adviser. Some reacted to this as a joke”. I would agree that this reaction is short sighted.

“Well me and my colleagues are in industry and we see the issues every day, we are the consultants, the IT auditors, systems administrators, security managers and network engineers. No we are not CEOs or business owners but it’s our job to educate and inform these business leaders of the risk of doing business on the internet. Sometimes they listen and too often they don’t seem to hear us”. All you can do is confidently state your case and get it in writing somewhere. But be aware that confidence should never be faked. Either learn the skills necessary FAST, or find another vocation. C-levels can detect BS ladies and gentlemen and the more of you that try to BS a C-level, the harder you’re making it for the rest of us. Ask yourselves why it is that security was once a board level thing and now most security chiefs reports to a CIO or COO.

“I see this every day as I travel across Florida doing IT audits and assessments. The organizations with a security role funded do 90 percent better than those with no such funded position.” Audits are a poor way of assessing the performance of security. Really poor in fact. Although it can be said that if an audit is failed – that’s uber bad, but if an audit is passed it does not mean all is good.

“One of the problems of the Internet is that we didn’t install what I like to call strong user authentication or strong file authentication.” Yes, we did. Its called an Operating System. For the most part the security sector has shied away from the OS because its hard for folk who don’t have an IT background to understand. Infosec would like to convince decision makers that it doesn’t exist, because if it does exist, then vendors can’t sell many of the snake oil offerings, and non-tech infosec folk are in a vulnerable position.

Operating Systems come with a slew of controls that can be used to thwart and/or detect attacks – perhaps it would be good if we started using them and reporting on how effectively the organisation uses each control? Why spend extra on snake oil products? For example, why spend gazillions on identity management in cloud deployments when we already have it?

“All too often we see organizations relegating cyber security to the IT department. I have said this a hundred times, cybersecurity is a business problem not an IT issue”. This statement suits a certain agenda that plays to the non-tech/GRC oriented folk. Security is a business problem AND an IT problem, but in terms of the intellectual capital required, its 10% a business problem, and 90% an IT problem.

“All users need awareness training” – yes, i think we are now at the stage where security has to be something that is everyone’s responsibility in the same way as checking for cars before crossing the road is everyone’s responsibility.

Infosec is in dire straits because of the loss of critical skills from the sector, and now we have a situation where people with the wrong skills are reporting to the likes of Rudy Giuliani with a lack of confidence and a myriad of confused messages, mostly built around self-serving interests at the expense of the whole. Its likely the former mayor of NY won’t be any wiser as to the scale of the problem, and therefore how to solve it.

Security professionals with no IT background are like animals handlers who are afraid of animals, and its these folk who are representing the sector.

The message that will be delivered to Giuliani will include the part that the sector needs more money. You know it really doesn’t – it needs less. Stop spending money on “next gen” products where “old gen” gets it done. “Legacy” stuff isn’t legacy unless you allow yourself to be duped by vendors into believing that its legacy. Really firewalls and OS offer most of what’s needed.

The same goes for people. We have too many people. Don’t create jobs around products – this is creating micro-specialisations that you are then calling ‘skills’, and hiring dedicated staff who won’t be very busy and won’t be very enthused or ‘synergistic’. This is what you’re looking for...http://www.seven-stones.biz/blog/addressing-the-information-security-skills-gap/

As Upton Sinclair said “It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it.” This quote lends itself to the problems in information security more than any other sector. Moreover it has defined information security as a broken entity since it was first adopted seriously by banks and then others.

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Clouds and Vulnerability Management

In the world of Clouds and Vulnerability Management, based on observations, it seems like a critical issue has slipped under the radar: if you’re running with PaaS and SaaS VMs, you cannot deliver anything close to a respectable level of vulnerability management with these platforms. This is because to do effective vulnerability management, the first part of that process – the vulnerability assessment – needs to be performed with administrative access (over SSH/SMB), and with PaaS and SaaS, you do not, as a customer, have such access (this is part of your agreement with the cloud provider). The rest of this article explains this issue in more detail.

The main reason for the clouding (sorry) of this issue, is what is still, after 20+ years, a fairly widespread lack of awareness of the ineffectiveness of unauthenticated vulnerability scanning. More and more security managers are becoming aware that credentialed scans are the only way to go. However, with a lack of objective survey data available, I can only draw on my own experiences. See – i’m one of those disgraceful contracting/consultant types, been doing security for almost 20 years, and been intimate with a good number of large organisations, and with each year that passes I can say that more organisations are waking up to the limitations of unauthenticated scanning. But there are also still lots more who don’t clearly see the limitations of unauthenticated scanning.

The original Nessus from the late 90s, now with Tenable, is a great product in terms of doing what it was intended to do. But false negatives were never a concern in with the design of Nessus. OpenVAS is still open source and available and it is also a great tool from the point of view of doing what it was intended to do. But if these tools are your sole source of vulnerability data, you are effectively running blind.

By the way Tenable do offer a product that covers credentialed scans for enterprises, but i have not had any hands-on experience with this tool. I do have hands on experience with the other market leaders’ products. By in large they all fall some way short but that’s a subject for another day.

Unauthenticated scanners all do the same thing:

  • port scan to find open ports
  • grab service banners – this is the equivalent of nmap -sV, and in fact as most of these tools use nmap libraries, is it _exactly_ that
  • lets say our tool finds Apache HTTP 14.x, it looks in its database of public disclosed vulnerability with that version of Apache, and spews out everything it finds. The tools generally do little in the way of actually probing with HTTP Methods for example, and they certainly were not designed to try, for example, a buffer overflow exploit attempt. They report lots of ‘noise’ in the way of false positives, but false negatives are the real concern.

So really the tools are doing a port scan, and then telling you you’re running old warez. Conficker is still very widespread and is the ultimate player in the ‘Pee’ arena (the ‘Pee’ in APT). An unauthenticated scanner doesn’t have enough visibility ‘under the hood’ to tell you if you are going to be the next Conficker victim, or the next ransomware victim. Some of the Linux vulnerabilities reported in the past few years – e.g. Heartbleed, Ghost, DirtyCOW – very few can be detected with an unauthenticated scanner, and none of these 3 examples can be detected with an unauthenticated scanner.

Credentialed scanning really is the only way to go. Credentialed based scanners are configured with root/administrative access to targets and are therefore in a position to ‘see’ everything.

The Connection With PaaS and SaaS

So how does this all relate to Cloud? Well, there two of the three cloud types where a lack of access to the operating system command shell becomes a problem – and from this description its fairly clear these are PaaS and SaaS.

 There are two common delusions abound in this area:

  • [Cloud maker] handles platform configuration and therefore vulnerability for me, so that’s ok, no need to worry:
    • Cloud makers like AWS and Azure will deal with patches, but concerns in security are much wider and operating systems are big and complex. No patches exist for 0days, and in space, nobody can hear you scream.
    • Many vulnerabilities arise from OS configuration aspects that cannot be removed with a patch – e.g. Conficker was mentioned above: some Conficker versions (yes its managed very professionally) use ‘at’ job scheduling to remain present even after MS08-067 is patched. If for example you use Azure, Microsoft manage your PaaS and SaaS but they don’t know if you want to use ‘at’ or not. Its safer for them to assume that you do want to use it, so they leave it enabled (when you sign up for PaaS or SaaS you are removed from the decision making here). Same applies to many other local services and file system permissions that are very popular with the dark side.
  • ‘Unauthenticated scanning gets me some of the way, its good enough’ – how much of the way does it get you? Less than half way? its more like 5% really. Remember its little more than a port scan, and you shouldn’t need a scanner to tell you you’re running old software. Certainly for critical cloud VMs, this is a problem.

With PaaS and SaaS, you are handing over the management of large and complex operating systems to cloud providers, who are perfectly justified, and also in many cases perfectly wise, in leaving open large security holes in your platforms, and as part of your agreement with them, there’s not a thing you can do about it (other than switch to IaaS or on-premise).

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The Art Of The Security Delta: NetDelta

In this article we’ll be answering the following questions:

  • What is NetDelta?
  • Why should i be monitoring for changes in my network(s)?
  • Challenges we faced along the way
  • Other ways of detecting deltas in networks
  • About NetDelta

What Is NetDelta?

NetDelta allows users to configure groups of IP addresses (by department, subnet, etc) and perform one-off or periodic port scans against the configured group, and have NetDelta send alerts when a change is detected.

There’s lot of shiny new stuff out there. APT-buster ™, Silver Bullet ™, etc. Its almost as though someone sits in a room and literally looks for combinations of words that haven’t been used yet and uses this as the driver for a new VC sponsored effort. “Ok ‘threat’ is the most commonly used buzzword currently. Has ‘threat’ been combined with ‘cyber’ and ‘buster’ yet?”, “No”, [hellllooow Benjamin]. The most positive spin we can place on this is that we got so excited about the future while ignoring the present.

These new products are seen as serving the modern day needs of information security, as though the old challenges, going back to day 0 in this sector, or “1998”, have been nailed. Well, how about the old stalwart of Vulnerability Management? The products do not “Manage” anything, they produce lists of vulnerability – this is “assessment”, not “management”. And the lists they produce are riddled with noise (false positives), and what’s worse is there’s a much bigger false negatives problem in that the tools do not cover whole swaths of corporate estates. Doesn’t sound like this is an area that is well served by open source or commercial offerings.

Why Do I Need To Monitor My Networks For Changes?

On the same theme of new products in infosec – how about firewalls (that’s almost as old as it gets)? Well we now have “next-gen” firewalls, but does that mean that old-gen firewalls were phased out, we solved the Network Access Control problem, and then moved on?

How about this: if there is a change in listening services, say in, for example – your perimeter DMZ (!), and you didn’t authorise it, that cannot be a good thing. Its one of either:

  • Hacker/malware activity, e.g. hacker’s connection service (e.g. root shell), or
  • Unauthorised change, e.g. networks ops changed firewall or DMZ host configuration outside of change control
  • You imagined it – perhaps lack of sleep or too much caffeine

Neither of these can be good. They can only be bad. And do we have a way to detect such issues currently?

How does NetDelta help us solve these problems?

Users can configure scans either on a one-off basis, or to be run periodically. So for example, as a user i can tell NetDelta to scan my DMZ perimeter every night at 2 AM and alert me by email if something changed from the previous night’s scan:

  • Previously unseen host comes online in a subnet, either as an unauthorised addition to the group, or unauthorised (rogue) firewall change or new host deployment (maybe an unsanctioned wifi access point or webcam, for example) – these concerns are becoming more valid in the age of Internet of Things (IoT) where devices are shipped with open telnets and so on.
  • Host goes offline – this could be something of interest from a service availability/DoS point of view, as well as the dreaded ‘unauthorised change’.
  • Change in the available services – e.g. hacker’s exploit is successful and manages to locally open a shell on an unfiltered higher port, or new service turned on outside of change control. NetDelta will alert if services are added or removed on a target host.

Host ‘state’ is maintained by NetDelta for as long as the retention period allows, and overall 10 status codes reflect the state of a host over successive periodic scans.

Challenges We Faced With NetDelta

The biggest and only major obstacle is the output of ‘noise’ that results from scan timeouts. With some of the earlier tests scans we noticed that sporadic scan time-outs would occur frequently. This presented a problem (its sort of a false positive) in that a delta is alerted on, but really there hasn’t been a change in listening services or hosts. We increased  the timeout options with nmap but it didn’t help much and only added masses of time on the scans.

The aforementioned issue is one of the issues holding back the nmap ndiff shell script wrapper option, and also ndiff works with XML text files (messy). Shell scripts can work in corporate situations sometimes, but there are problems around the longevity and reliability of the solution. NetDelta is a web-based database (currently MySQL but NoSQL is planned) driven solution with reports and statistics readily available, but the biggest problem with the ndiff option is the scan timeout issues mentioned in the previous paragraph.

NetDelta records host “up” and “down” states and allows the user to configure a number for the number of scans before being considered really down. So if the user chooses 3 as an option, if a target host is down for 3 consecutive scans, it is considered actually down, and a delta is flagged.

Overall the ‘state’ of a host is recorded in the backend database, and the state is a code that reflects a change in the availability or existence of a host. NetDelta has a total of 10 status codes.

Are There Other Ways To Detect NetDeltas?

Remember that we’re covering network services here, i.e. the ‘visibility’ of network services, as they appear to hackers and your customers alike. This is not the same as local host configuration. I can run a netstat command locally to get a list of listening services, but this doesn’t tell me how well my firewall(s) protect me.

  • The ndiff option was covered already
  • Firewall management suites. At least one of these can flag changes in firewall rules, but it still doesn’t give the user the actual “real” view of services. Firewalls can be misconfigured, and they can do unexpected things under certain conditions. The port scanner view of a network is the holy grail effectively – its the absolute/real view that leaves no further room for interpretation and does not require further processing
  • IDS – neither HIDS (host based intrusion detection) nor NIDS (network based intrusion detection) can give a good representation of the view.
  • SIEM – these systems take in logs from other sources so partly by extrapolating from the previous comments, and also with the capability of SIEM itself, it would seem to be a challenge to ask a SIEM to do acrobatics in this area. First of all SIEM is not a cheap solution, but of course this conversation only applies to a case where the organisation already owns a SIEM and can afford the added log storage space, and management overhead, and…of the SIEMs i know, none of them are sufficiently flexible to:
    • take in logs from a port scanning source – theoretically its possible if you could get nmap to speak rsyslogish though, and i’m sure there’s some other acrobatics that are feasible
    • perform delta analysis on those logs and raise an alert

About NetDelta

NetDelta is a Python/Django based project with a MySQL backend (we will migrate to MongoDB – watch this space). Currently at v 1.0, you are most welcome to take part in a trial. We stand on the shoulders of giants:

  • nmap (https://nmap.org/)
  • Python (https://www.python.org/)
  • Django (https://www.djangoproject.com/)
  • Celery (http://www.celeryproject.org/)
  • RabbitMQ (https://www.rabbitmq.com/)
  • libnmap – a Python framework for nmap – (https://github.com/savon-noir/python-libnmap)

Contact us for more info!

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Information Security Pseudo-skills and the Power of 6

How many Security Analysts does it take to change a light bulb? The answer should be one but it seems organisations are insistent on spending huge amounts of money on armies of Analysts with very niche “skills”, as opposed to 6 (yes, 6!) Analysts with certain core skills groups whose abilities complement each other. Banks and telcos with 300 security professionals could reduce that number to 6.

Let me ask you something: is Symantec Control Compliance Suite (CCS) a “skill” or a product or both? Is Vulnerability Management a skill? Its certainly not a product. Is HP Tippingpoint IPS a product or a skill?

Is McAfee Vulnerability Manager 7.5 a skill whereas the previous version is another skill? So if a person has experience with 7.5, they are not qualified to apply for a shop where the previous version is used? Ok this is taking it to the extreme, but i dare say there have been cases where this analogy is applicable.

How long does it take a person to get “skilled up” with HP Arcsight SIEM? I was told by a respected professional who runs his own practice that the answer is 6 months. My immediate thought is not printable here. Sorry – 6 months is ridiculous.

So let me ask again, is Symantec CCS a skill? No – its a product. Its not a skill. If you take a person who has experience in operational/technical Vulnerability Management – you know, vulnerability assessment followed by the treatment of risk, then they will laugh at the idea that CCS is a skill. Its only a skill to someone who has never seen a command shell before, tested manually for a false positive, or taken part in an unrestricted manual network penetration test.

Being a software product from a major vendor means the GUI has been designed to make the software intuitive to use. I know that in vulnerability assessment, i need to supply the tool with IP addresses of targets and i need to tell the tool which tests I want to run against those targets. Maybe the area where I supply the addresses of targets is the tab which has “targets” written on it? And I don’t want to configure the same test every time I run it, maybe this “templates” tab might be able to help me? Do i need a $4000 2-week training course and a nice certificate to prove to the world that I can work effectively with such a product? Or should there be an effective accreditation program which certifies core competencies (including evidence of the ability to adapt fast to new tools) in security? I think the answer is clear.

A product such as a Vulnerability Management product is only a “Window” to a Vulnerability Management solution. Its only a GUI. It has been tailored to be intuitive to use. Its the thin layer on top of the Vulnerability Management solution. The solution itself is much bigger than this. The product only generates list of vulnerabilities. Its how the organisation treats those vulnerabilities that is key – and the product does not help too much with the bigger picture.

Historically vulnerability management has been around for years. Then came along commercial products, which basically just slapped a GUI on processes and practices that existed for 20 years+, after which the jobs market decided to call the product the solution. The product is the skill now, whereas its really vulnerability management that is the skill.

The ability to adapt fast to new tools is a skill in itself but it also is a skill that should be built-in by default: a skill that should be inherent with all professionals who enter the field. Flexibility is the key.

The real skills are those associated with areas for large volumes of intellectual capital. These are core technologies. Say a person has 5 years+ experience of working in Unix environments as a system administrator and has shown interest in scripting. Then they learn some aspects of network penetration testing and are also not afraid of other technologies (such as Windows). I can guarantee that they will be up and running in less than one day with any new Vulnerability Management tool, or SIEM tool, or [insert marketing buzzphrase here] that vendors can magic up.

Different SIEM tools use different terms and phrases for the same basic idea. HP uses “flex connectors” whilst Splunk talks about “Forwarders” and “Heavy Forwarders” and so on. But guess what? I understand English but If i don’t know what the words mean, i can check in an online dictionary. I know what a SIEM is designed to do and i get the data flows and architecture concept. Network aggregation of syslog and Windows Events is not an alien concept to me, and neither are all layers of the TCP/IP stack (a really basic requirement for all Analysts – or should be). Therefore i can adapt very easily to new tools in this space.

IPS/IDS and Firewalls? Well they’re not even very functional devices. If you have ever setup Snort or iptables you’ll be fine with whatever product is out there. Recently myself and another Consultant were asked to configure a Tippingpoint device. We were up and running in 10 minutes. There were a few small items that we needed to check against the product documentation. I have 15 years+ experience in the field but the other guy is new. Nonetheless he had configured another IPS product before. He was immediately up and running with the product – no problem. Of course what to configure in the rule base – that is a bigger story and it requires knowledge of threats, attack techniques and vulnerabilities – but that area is GENERIC to security – its not specific to a product.

I’ve seen some truly crazy job specifications. One i saw was Websense Specialist!! Come on – its a web proxy! Its Squid with extra cosmetic functions. The position would be filled by a Websense “Olympian” probably. But what sort of job is that? Carpe Diem my friends, Carpe Diem.

If you run a security consultancy and you follow the usual market game of micro-boxed, pigeon-holed security skills, i don’t know how you can survive. A requirement comes up for a project that involves a number of different products. Your existing consultants don’t have those products written anywhere on their CVs, so you go to market looking for contractors at 600 USD per day. You either find the people somehow, or you turn the project down.  Either way you lose out massively. Or – you could have a base of 6 (its that number again) consultants with core skills that complement each other.

If the over-specialisation issue were addressed, businesses would save considerably on human resource and also find it easier to attract the right people. Pigeon-holed jobs are boring. It is possible and advisable to acquire human resource able to cover more bases in risk management.

There are those for and against accreditation in security. I think there is a solution here which is covered in more detail of Chapter 11 of Security De-engineering.

So how many Security Analysts does it take to change a light bulb? The answer is 6, but typically in real life the number is the mark of the beast: 666.

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Scangate Re-visited: Vulnerability Scanners Uncovered

I have covered VA tools before but I feel that one year later, the same misconceptions prevail. The notion that VA tools really can be used to give a decent picture of vulnerability is still heavily embedded, and that notion in itself presents a serious vulnerability for businesses.

A more concise approach at a run down on the functionality of VA warez may be worth a try. At least lets give it one last shot. On second thoughts, no, don’t shoot anything.

Actually forget “positive” or “negative” views on VAs before reading this. I am just going to present the facts based on what I know myself and of course I’m open to logical, objective discussion. I may have missed something.

Why the focus on VA? Well, the tools are still so commonplace and heavily used and I don’t believe that’s in our best interests.

What I discovered many years ago (it was actually 2002 at first) was that discussions around these tools can evoke some quite emotional responses. “Emotional” you quiz? Yes. I mean when you think about it, whole empires have been built using these tools. The tools are so widespread in security and used as the basis of corporate VM programs. VM market revenues runs at around 1 billion USD annually. Songs and poems have been written about VAs – OK I can’t back that up, but careers have been built and whole enterprise level security software suites built using a nasty open source VA engine.

I presented on the subject of automation in VA all those years ago, and put forward a notion that running VA tools doesn’t carry much more value as compared to something like this: nmap -v -sS -sV <targets> . Any Security Analyst worth their weight in spam would see open ports and service banners, and quickly deduce vulnerability from this limited perspective. “Limited”, maybe, but is a typical VA tool in a better position to interrogate a target autotragically?

One pre-qualifier I need to throw out is that the type of scanners I will discuss here are Nessus-like scanners, the modus operandi of which is to use unauthenticated means to scan a target. Nessus itself isn’t the main focus but it’s the tool that’s most well known and widely used. The others do not present any major advantages over Nessus. In fact Nessus is really as good as it gets. There’s a highly limited potential with these tools and Nessus reaches that limit.

Over the course of my infosec career I have had the privilege to be in a position where I have been coerced into using VAs extensively, and spent many long hours investigating false positives. In many cases I set up a dummy Linux target and used a packet sniffer to deduce what the tool was doing. As a summary, the findings were approximately:

  • Out of the 1000s of tests, or “patterns”, configured in the tools, only a few have the potential to result in accurate/useful findings. Some examples of these are SNMP community string tests, and tests for plain text services (e.g. telnet, FTP).
  • The vast majority of the other tests merely grab a service “banner”. For example, the tool port scans, finds an open port 80 TCP, then runs a test to grab a service banner (e.g. Apache 2.2.22, mickey mouse plug-in, bla bla). I was sort of expecting the tool to do some more probing having found a specific service and version, but in most cases it does not.
  • The tool, having found what it thinks is a certain application layer service and version, then correlates its finding with its database of public disclosed vulnerabilities for the detected service.

Even for some of the plan text services, some of the tests which have the potential to reveal useful findings have been botched by the developers. For example, tests for anonymous FTP only work with a very specific flavour of FTP. Other FTP daemons return different messages for successful anonymous logins and the tool does not accommodate this.

Also what happens if a service is moved from its default port? I had some spectacular failures with running Nessus against a FTP service on port 1980 TCP (usually it is listening on port 21). Different timing options were tested. Nessus uses a nmap engine for port scanning, but nmap by itself is usually able to find non-default port services using default settings.

So in summary, what the VA tools do is mostly just report that you are running ridiculous unencrypted blast-from-the-past services or old, down-level services – maybe. Really I would hope security teams wouldn’t need to spend 25K USD on an enterprise solution to tell them this.

False positives is one thing, but false negatives is quite another. Popular magazines always report something like 50% success rate in finding vulnerabilities in staged tests. Why is it always 50%? Remember also that the product under testing is usually one from a vendor who pays for a full spread ad in that magazine.

Putting numbers to false negatives makes little sense with huge, complex software packages of millions of lines of source code. However, it occurred to me not so long ago whilst doing some white box testing on a client’s critical infrastructure: how many of the vulnerabilities under testing could possibly be discovered by use of a VA tool? In the case of Oracle Database the answer was less than 5%. And when we’re talking Oracle, we’re usually talking critical, as in crown jewels critical.

If nothing else, the main aspect I would hope the reader would take out of this discussion is about expectation. The expectation that is set by marketing people with VA tools is that the tools really can be used to accurately detect a wide range of vulnerability, and you can bet your business on the tools by using them to test critical infrastructure. Ladies and gentlemen: please don’t be deceived by this!

Can you safely replace manual testing with use of these tools? Yes, but only if the target has zero value to the business.

 

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Blame The CEO?

I would like to start by issuing a warning about the content in this article. I will be taking cynicism to the next level, so the baby-eyed, and “positive” among us should avert their gaze after this first paragraph. For those in tune with their higher consciousness, I will summarise: Can we blame the C-levels for our problems? Answer: no. Ok, pass on through now. More positive vibes may be found in the department of delusion down the hall.

The word “salt” was for the first time ever inserted into the hall of fame of Information Security buzzwords after the Linkedin hack infamy, and then Yahoo came along and spoiled the ridicule-fest by showing to the world that they could do even better than Linkedin by not actually using any password hashing at all.

There is a tendency among the masses to latch onto little islands of intellectual property in the security world. Just as we see with “cloud”, the “salt” element of the Linkedin affair was given plenty of focus, because as a result of the incident, many security professionals had learned something new – a rare occurrence in the usual agenda of tick-in-box-marking that most analysts are mandated to follow.

With Linkedin, little coverage was given to the tedious old nebulous “compromise” element, or “how were the passwords compromised?”. No – the “salt” part was much more exciting to hose into blogs and twitter – but with hundreds of analysts talking about the value of “salting”, the value of this pearl of wisdom was falling exponentially with time – there was a limited amount of time in which to become famous. If you were tardy in showing to the world that you understood what “salting” means, your tweet wouldn’t be favourite’d or re-tweeted, and the analyst would have to step back off the stage and go back to their usual humdrum existence of entering ticks in boxes, telling devs to use two-factor authentication as a matter of “best practices”, “run a vulnerability scanner against it”, and such ticks related matters.

Infosec was down and flailing around helplessly, then came the Linkedin case. The inevitable fall-out from the “salting” incident (I don’t call it the Linkedin incident any more) was a kick of sand in the face of the already writhing information security industry. Although I don’t know of any specific cases, based on twelve happy years of marriage with infosec, i’m sure they’re as abundant as the stars and occurring as I write this. I am sure that nine times out of ten, whenever devs need to store a password, they are told by CISSP-toting self-righteous analysts (and blindly backed up by their managers) that it is “best practice” and “mandatory” to use salting with passwords – regardless of all the other factors that go into making up the full picture of risk, the operational costs, and other needless over-heads. There will be times when salting is a good idea. Other times not. There cannot be a zero-value proposition here – but blanket, parrot-fashion advisories are exactly that.

The subject matter of the previous four paragraphs serves as a recent illustrator of our plight in security. My book covers a much larger piece of the circus-o-sphere and its certainly too much to even to try to summarise here, but we are epic-failing on a daily basis. One of the subjects I cover in Security De-engineering is the role of C-Level executives in security, and I ask the question “can we blame the C-levels” for the broken state of infosec?

Let’s take a trip down memory lane. The heady days of the late 90s were owned by technical wizards, sometimes known as Hackers. They had green hair and piercings. If a CEO ran some variant of a Windows OS on her laptop, she was greeted with a stream of expletives. Ok, “best practices” was nowhere to be seen in the response, and it is a much more offensive swear-phrase than any swear word I can think of, but the point is that the Hacker’s reposte could be better.

Hackers have little or no business acumen. They have the tech talent that the complexities of information security afford, but back when they worked in infosec in the late 90s, they were poorly managed. Artists need an agent to represent them, and there were no agents.

Hackers could theoretically be locked in a room with a cat-flap for food and drink, no email, and no phone. The only person they should be allowed to communicate with is their immediate security line manager. They could be used as a vault of intellectual capital, or a swiss army knife in the organisation. Problem was – the right kind of management was always lacking. Organisations need an interface between themselves and the Hackers. No such interface ever existed unfortunately.

The upper levels of management gave up working with Hackers for various reasons, not just for scaring the living daylights out of their normal earthling colleagues. Then came the early noughties. Hackers were replaced by respectable analysts with suits and ties, who sounded nice, used the words “governance” and “non-repudiation” a lot, and didn’t swear at their managers regardless of ineptitude levels. The problem with the latter CASE (Checklist and Standards Evangelist) were illustrated with the “salting” debacle and Linkedin.

There is a link between information and information security (did you notice the play on words there – information was used in…”information”… and also in… “information security” – thereby implicating that there might just be a connection). The CASE successor to the realm actually managed to convince themselves (but few others in the business world) that security actually has nothing to do with information technology. It is apparently all about “management” and “processes”. So – every analyst is now a “manager”?! So who in the organisation is going to actually talk to ops and devs and solve the risk versus cost of safeguard puzzles? There are no foot soldiers, only a security department composed entirely of managers.

Another side of our woes is the security products space. Products have been lobbied by fierce marketing engines and given ten-out-of-ten ratings by objective information security publications. The products supposedly can automate areas of information risk management, and tell us things we didn’t already know about our networks. The problem is when you automate processes, you’re looking for accurate results. Right? Well, in certain areas such as vulnerability assessment, we don’t even get close to accurate results – and vulnerability assessment is one area where accuracy is sorely needed – especially if we are using automation to assess vulnerability in critical situations.

Some product classes do actually make some sense to deploy in some business cases, but the number of cases where something like SIEM (for example) actually make sense as as an investment is a small number of the whole.

Security line managers feel the pressure of compliance as the main part of their function. In-house advice is pretty much of the out-house variety in most cases, and service providers aren’t always so objective when it comes to technology acquisition. Products are purchased as a show of diligence for clueless auditors and a short cut to a tick-in-a-box.

So the current security landscape is one of a lack of appropriate skills, especially at security line-management level, which in turn leads to market support for whatever bone-headed product idea can be dreamed up next. The problems come in two boxes then – skills and products.

Is it the case that security analysts and line managers are all of the belief that everything is fine in their corner? The slew of incidents, outgoing connections to strange addresses in eastern Europe, and the loss of ownership of workstation subnets – it’s not through any fault of information security professionals? I have heard some use the excuse “we can never keep out bad guys all the time” – which actually is true, but there is little real confidence in the delivery of this message. Even with the most confidence – projecting among us, there is an inward sense of disharmony with things. We all know, just from intuition, that security is about IT (not just business) and that the value we offer to businesses is extremely limited in most cases.

CEOs and other silver-heads read non-IT publications, and often-times incidents will be reported, even in publications such as the Financial Times. Many of them are genuinely concerned about their information assets, and they will ask for updates from someone like a CISO. It is unlikely the case, as some suggest, they don’t care about information security and it is also unlikely, as is often claimed, that security budgets are rejected minus any consideration.

CEOs will make decisions on security spending based on available information. Have they ever been in a position where they can trust us with our line reporting? Back in the 90s they were sworn at with business-averse rhetoric. Later they were bombarded with IT-averse rhetoric, green pie charts from expensive vulnerability management suites, delivered with a perceptible lack of confidence in analyst skills and available tools.

So can we blame CEOs? Of course not, and our prerogative now should be re-engineering of skills, with a better system of “graduation” through the “ranks” in security, and an associated single body of accreditation (Chapter 11 of Security De-engineering covers this in more detail). With better skills, the products market would also follow suit and change radically. All of this would enable CISOs to report on security postures with confidence, which in turn enables trust at the next level up the ladder.

The idea that CEOs are responsible for all our problems is one of the sacred holy cows of the security industry (along with some others that I will be covering). Ladies and gentlemen: security analysts, managers, self-proclaimed “Evangelists”, “Subject Matter Experts”, and other ego-packing gurus of our time are responsible for the problems.

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isPasswordOK?

Not sure how resistant is your password to real world hacker password enumeration vectors? There’s an app for that.

The folks over at Literatecode have developed an IPhone app called isPasswordOK to help the average person select a strong password.

When users sign-up for online services they are often asked to give a password. They enter the password, as an example…”Password”, this doesn’t pass the test on the blog sign-up form? However “P4ssw0rd” passes the test (there’s a Javascript “password strength” indicator script that assesses password strength allegedly), but those meters do not take into account real world enumeration/ccracking techniques. Generally the user is told they have a “Good” or “fair” password as long as their password passes the format test (e.g. One upper case, one lower case, one punctuation mark) . Clearly to those in the know, P4ssw0rd is a bad password, but not according to most online registration form strength indicators.

Passwords authentication poses a nightmare for users and security departments. They can’t be too complex because then they get written down somewhere where others can see them (in one case the employee wrote a password on the ceiling board over their desk). Then…obviously they can’t be too simple. But passwords are all we have in many cases, so let’s do our best to choose a good one – and this is not as simple as many folk believe it to be.

This app is a nice innovation, long overdue, and sorely needed, as demonstrated by the myriad of password compromises globally.

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